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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
AND SECURITY AND RECONSTRUCTION† 
 
Muna Ndulo∗ 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Several studies show that despite recent increases in the number of minor 
conflicts, long-term trends suggest that international and civil wars are declining1.  
Analyzing the causes of the improvement in global security since 1990, the 2006 Human 
Security Report argues that the United Nations played a critically important role in 
spearheading a huge upsurge of international conflict prevention, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding activities.2  The evidence that these initiatives worked is not just 
circumstantial.  Contrary to popular perceptions, a recent RAND Corporation study, for 
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1
 Human Security Brief 2006, Human Security Report Centre (2006), available at 
http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2006/overview.aspx.  See also Human Security Report 
2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War (2010), Human Security Report Project, 
available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx. 
2
 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, The Challenges of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War, in HOW 
TO SPEND $50 BILLION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE 39, 51 (Bjørn Lomborg ed., 2006).  See also 
Human Security Brief 2006, supra note 1, at ch. 3.  The 2009/2010 Human Security Report makes the same 
point and states that, while not suggesting that it is the sole explanation, peacemaking and peacebuilding 
makes a difference.  Human Security Report 2009/2010, supra note 1, at pt. I. 
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example, found that two-thirds of the UN’s peacebuilding missions had succeeded.3  In 
addition, the sharp increase in peacemaking efforts led to a significant increase in the 
number of conflicts ending in negotiated settlements.4  The annual cost of the charges to 
the international community has been modest — well under 1% of world military 
spending.5  The US Government Accountability Office estimated that it would cost the 
United States approximately twice as much as the United Nations to conduct a 
peacekeeping operation similar to the UN stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH): 
an estimated $876 million compared to the UN budgeted $428 million for the first 14 
months of the mission.6  In fact, in 2006, the cost of running all of the UN’s 19 
peacekeeping operations around the world for an entire year was less than the United 
States spent in Iraq at the height of the Iraq war in a single month.7  Despite the positive 
changes, the RAND Corporation study makes it clear that there are no grounds for 
complacency.8 
 Although the number of wars has decreased, far too many remain — and there are 
still several places of instability around the globe that could easily turn into conflict areas.  
                                                 
3
 JAMES DOBBINS, A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 6 (2007) (including 
testimony presented before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee. on International 
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight on June 13, 2007). 
4
 Id. at 7. 
5
 See Financing Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml; and UN 
Peacekeeping Background Note,  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf.  The 
approved peacekeeping budget for the period from July 2010 to June 2011 is approximately U.S. $7.3 
billion.  This represents about 0.5 percent of global military spending, estimated at U.S. $1.531 trillion. Id. 
6
 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-331, PEACEKEEPING: COST COMPARISON OF ACTUAL UN 
AND HYPOTHETICAL US OPERATIONS IN HAITI 7 (2006). 
7
 Dobbins points out that the UN is a comparatively efficient and cost effective force provider.  In its 
specialized agencies, it possesses a broad panoply of civil as well as military capabilities needed for nation 
building.  DOBBINS, supra note 3, at 2.  All missions UN missions are planned, controlled, and sustained by 
a few hundred military and civilian staffers at UN headquarters in New York.  Id.  Most troops come from 
Third World countries whose costs per deployed soldier are a small fraction of any western army.  Id.  See 
also Richard Wolf, Afghan War Costs Now Outpace Iraq’s, USA TODAY, May 13, 2010, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-05-12-afghan_N.htm.  
8
 DOBBINS, supra note 3, at 8. 
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Furthermore, because the underlying causes of conflicts are too rarely addressed, the risks 
of new conflicts breaking out in the same area and old ones starting up again remain very 
real.  This happened in Haiti where the UN is in its second peacekeeping mission to the 
country.9  In terms of the challenge to establish enduring peace in conflict zones, the 
Security Council has emphasized that “the biggest deterrent to violent conflict is 
addressing the root causes of conflict, including through the promotion of sustainable 
development and a democratic society based on a strong rule of law and civic institutions, 
including adherence to all human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural.”10  
One of the determinants of success, therefore, of any peacekeeping mission is the extent 
to which it has the capacity to address the root causes of a conflict in the host state of the 
mission.  In August 2000, a famous UN report, the Brahimi Report, acknowledged the 
shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping efforts and recommended wide-ranging reforms 
aimed at strengthening the operations and making them more effective.11  Since then 
there have been numerous other reports aimed at implementing reforms to strengthen 
United Nations peacekeeping operations.12 
This article builds on that report and discusses the broad challenges facing United 
Nations peacekeeping missions today and the role of the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations in the resolution of conflicts and in the reconstruction of post conflicts states.  
The objective of the article is to identify areas that need attention to make peacekeeping 
                                                 
9
 Ian Martin, Paper versus Steel: The First Phase of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti, in 
HONORING HUMAN RIGHTS AND KEEPING THE PEACE: LESSONS FROM EL SALVADOR, CAMBODIA, AND 
HAITI 83 (Alice H. Henkin ed., 1995). 
10
 S.C. Res. 1327, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1327 (Nov. 13, 2000). 
11
 Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, Rep., transmitted by identical letters dated Aug. 21, 2000 from the 
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000).  The report is called the Brahimi Report after its 
chairman of the committee which produced the report. 
12
 E.g. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/608 (Dec. 15, 2004). 
 4
missions more effective.  The article is broken down into the following sections: (II) 
peacekeeping in theory and practice; (III) the peacekeeping mandate; (IV) conditions and 
factors that can help determine the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission; and (IV) 
the broad challenges that face peacekeeping missions. 
 
 II. PEACEKEEPING:  BACKGROUND, THEORY, AND PRACTICE   
 
 The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order to “save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”13  Meeting this challenge is the most 
important yardstick by which the organization is judged by the people it exists to serve.  
One of the most important ways in which the UN intervenes in conflicts and promotes 
peace is through peacekeeping operations.  Given the centrality of peacekeeping to 
United Nations peace initiatives, it is somewhat surprising that no precise definition of 
peacekeeping can be found in the United Nations Charter.14  It would appear, therefore, 
that the “technique of peacekeeping is a distinctive innovation by the United Nations.”15  
In all likelihood, this is the result of the fact that the Charter’s authors “envisaged that 
threats to international peace and security would primarily consist of aggression by one 
state against another. . . . Peacekeeping was not envisaged as part of the organization’s 
role, which lay primarily in establishing a system of collective security.”16  Peacekeeping 
missions do not seem to fit within the scope of the activities specified by chapter VI of 
                                                 
13
 U.N. Charter preamble. 
14
 FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 717 (2d ed. 1993). 
15
 Brian Urquhart, The United Nations, Collective Security and International Peacekeeping, in 
NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER: THE ARTISANSHIP AND ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY 59, 62 (Alan 
K. Henrikson ed., Scholarly Res. 1986). 
16
 ALEX J. BELLAMY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING 46 (2004). 
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the Charter, which concerns the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” or chapter VII of the 
Charter, which addresses “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace and Acts of Aggression.”17  As a practical matter, when establishing a 
peacekeeping mission, the Security Council has usually invoked chapter VI of the United 
Nations Charter.18  Peacekeeping missions are distinct from enforcement actions 
undertaken by the United Nations under chapter VII of the Charter, as “[e]nforcement 
action is directed against a state or other political entity, and has a coercive design.  U.N. 
peacekeeping, on the other hand, is not directed ‘against’ a particular wrongdoer and 
traditionally has involved coercion only in a minimal sense, if at all.”19  The Charter 
contains a tension between the doctrines of national sovereignty and the protection and 
promotion of individual rights and the promotion of peace and security generally in the 
context of a civil war.20  Although the preamble of the Charter contains an affirmation to 
“reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,”21  article 2(7) states that “nothing contained 
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”22 
Peacekeeping operations have been a major activity of the United Nations almost 
since its establishment in 1945.  The United Nations has been involved in over 63 
                                                 
17
 See U.N. Charter, art. 33-51. 
18
 BRUCE R. PIRNIE & WILLIAM E. SIMONS, SOLDIERS FOR PEACE: CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES xi 
(1996).  
19
 KIRGIS, supra note 14, at 716.  
20
 The Charter in Chapter I, Article 2(7) guarantees sovereignty by providing that “[n]othing contained in 
the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement 
under the present Charter.”  U.N. Charter art. 2, para 7.  But in Article 13, the United Nations undertakes to 
promote human rights.  Id. at art. 13, para 1. 
21
 Id. at preamble. 
22
 Id. at art. 2, para. 7. 
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peacekeeping missions since 1948.23  As the practice has evolved over the years, a 
peacekeeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military 
personnel, but without enforcement powers undertaken by the United Nations to help 
maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.24  These 
operations are voluntary and based on consent and cooperation.  While they involve the 
use of military personnel, the peacekeeping missions achieve their objectives not by force 
of arms, thus contrasting them with the enforcement action of the United Nations under 
article 42 of the Charter.25  United Nations peacekeeping missions typically also involve 
a large number of civilians and civilian police.26  United Nations peacekeeping is a 
unique and dynamic mechanism developed by the United Nations and is means to help 
countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace.27 
The first United Nations peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when the 
Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East 
to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.28  Over the 
years, UN peacekeeping has evolved to meet the demands of different conflicts and a 
                                                 
23
 United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml. 
24
 A former UN Legal Counsel has defined peacekeeping operations as actions involving the use of military 
personnel in international conflicts situations on the basis of the consent of all parties concerned and 
without resorting to armed force except in cases of self defense.  E. Suy, Peace-Keeping Operations, in A 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (R.J. Dupuy ed., 1988). 
25
 Article 42 of the United Nations Charter provides for the Security Council to take enforcement measures 
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.  Such actions may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United 
Nations.  U.N. Charter art. 42. 
26
 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operation: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. A/62/627 (Dec. 28, 2007). 
27
 Dag Hammarskjld referred to peacekeeping as belonging to “Chapter VI and a half,” which puts it 
between traditional methods of peaceful dispute resolution such as negotiation and mediation under 
Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII.  60 Years United Nations 
Peacekeeping, United Nations Information Service, 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/60years_peacekeeping.pdf. 
28
 KIRGIS, supra note 14, at 720.  
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changing political landscape.  During the Cold War, when cold war rivalries frequently 
paralyzed the Security Council, UN peacekeeping goals were primarily limited to 
maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground, so that efforts could be 
made at the political level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.29  They operated 
under UN command and were primarily mandated with the implementation of activities 
agreed upon by warring factions, such as the cantonment and separation of belligerents, 
the monitoring of borders, and the verification of the ceasefire.30  With the end of the 
Cold War, the strategic context for UN peacekeeping dramatically changed, prompting 
the UN organization to shift and expand its field operations from “traditional missions” 
involving strictly military tasks to complex “multidimensional” enterprises designed to 
ensure the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the 
foundation for sustainable peace.31 
The transformation of peacekeeping missions reflects in the UN’s own words 
more than hybridization: “The goals of Peacekeeping Missions have in fact changed 
significantly: from assisting in the maintenance of ceasefires during cold war 
peacekeeping operations during the 1990s increasingly becoming peacebuilding 
missions.”32  The broad and complex mandates of today’s multidimensional peace 
                                                 
29
 60 Years of UN Peacekeeping, supra note 27; A History of Peacekeeping, http://un.org/en/peacekeeping/ 
operations/surge.shtml. 
30
 See generally Larry M. Forster, Training Standards for United Nations Military Observers: The 
Foundation of Excellence, 6 AFR. SECURITY REV. 4 (1997).  Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills observe, “Until 
the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was largely a matter of upholding a peace already agreed to. After 
the fall of the Berlin Wall peacekeeping became more ambitious as the international community sought to 
rebuild failed states  and grapple with complex emergencies.”  See Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills, From 
Peacekeeping to Managing Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa, in FROM 
PEACEKEEPING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES: PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS IN AFRICA 2-3 (Jakkie Cilliers & 
Greg Mills eds., 1999). 
31
 60 Years of UN Peacekeeping, supra note 27; A History of Peacekeeping, supra note 29. 
32
 U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Multidisciplinary Peacebuilding: Lessons from Recent 
Experience, (Apr. 1999).  In those days the UN were defenders of the status quo, and operated with light 
arms under the strict instruction to use force only in self-defense. 
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operations reflect the varied civilian, military, and police capabilities required to provide 
support to the challenges of modern day peacekeeping.  These include tasks such as 
promoting political transitions, assisting in the development of political structures, 
demobilization of armed forces, the provision of humanitarian relief during emergencies 
to refugees and internally displaced people, establishing the rule of law, promoting 
security, supporting disarmament, holding elections, and jump-starting the economy.33  
As an example, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique involved peacekeeping, the 
demobilization of armed forces, provision of humanitarian aid, democratization, 
demining, the return of Mozambican refugees that had fled to neighboring countries, and 
electoral support which culminated in the 1994 general election which ushered in a post 
conflict government.34  Other missions — including the UN Transition Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) in Namibia, the UN Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) in South 
Africa, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and the UN Observer 
Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) — had huge electoral mandates that included 
organizing elections and monitoring the electoral process.35  Indicative of the change in 
                                                 
33
 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 26, at ¶ 19.  See also Peter H. Gantz, The Postconflict Security Gap 
and the United Nations Peace Operations System, in SECURITY, RECONSTRUCTION, AND RECONCILIATION: 
WHEN THE WARS END 247(Muna Ndulo ed., 2007).  In Mozambique “the United Nations established a 
trust fund to help RENAMO transform itself from a military movement into a political party.”  UNITED 
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995 4 
(1995). The UN argues that the “transformation of a guerrilla force, experienced only in war, into a 
political entity with a stake in the democratic process, is one of the most significant legacies of the United 
Nations operation” in Mozambique.  Id. 
34
 THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995, supra note 33. 
35
 Jeff Fischer, Elections and International Civilian Policing: History and Practice in Peace Operations, 
INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SERVICES WHITE PAPERS (June 18, 2002).  ONUMOZ was 
established by Security Council resolution 799 in December 1992 to help implement the general peace 
agreement signed on October 4, 1992 by the president of Mozambique and the president of the Resistancia 
Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO).  UNTAG was established in accordance with resolution 632 of 
February 1989 to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure the early 
independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the UN.  
ONUSAL was established on May 20, 1991 by Security Council resolution 1991.  Its mandate was to 
verify the implementation of all agreements between the government of El Salvador and Frente Farbundo 
Marti para la Liberacion Nacional aimed at ending a decade long civil war.  UNTAC was established by 
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strategy was a 1999 UN report which recommended that “mandates should be 
conceptualized flexibly and could include elements of peacebuilding and emergency 
reconstruction of war torn economies.”36 
In the early 1990s, the UN Security Council launched an unprecedented number 
of peacekeeping operations.37  By the mid-nineties, political and financial support for 
peacekeeping operations had waned, especially from the United States after the failure of 
the United States-led (and UN-sanctioned) mission in Somalia in 1992 and 1993.38  
Support from troop-contributing countries shriveled as the UN fell behind in its payments 
and military challenges in civil war situations mounted.39 
Despite the supposed broad array of conflict management techniques, 
international attention remains fixed on “peacekeeping” or the utility of multinational 
interventions as an essential element in the amelioration or resolution of armed conflict.  
The frustrating aspect of the approach is that even as the perceived demand for 
peacekeeping has increased, the capacity of the UN to deliver peacekeepers seems to 
have diminished.40  This is largely because of the huge cost implications of peacekeeping 
operations.  The two UN missions in Southern Sudan and Darfur faced many difficulties 
                                                                                                                                                 
Security Council resolution 745 of February 28, 1992 to ensure the implementation of the Agreement of a 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict signed in Paris on October 23, 1991.  
UNOMSA was established by Security Council resolution 772 in 1992 and 1994 to assist the people of 
South Africa in their transition from apartheid South Africa to a non-racial democratic society.  Id. 
36Rep. of the Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent 
Experience, (1999). 
37
 THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 620 (David M. Malone ed., 
2004).  Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills observed that “the early 1990s were the high water mark in the 
euphoria of the post-cold war era of peacekeeping.  While 13 operations were established in the first 40 
years of UN peacekeeping, 36 new operations have been launched since 1988.”  Cilliers and Mills, supra 
note 30, at 1. 
38
 ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA: LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE AND GUINEA-BISSAU 16 
(2002). 
39
 DOBBINS , supra note 3, at 3. 
40
 Rep. of the Special Comm. On Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly, Comprehensive Review of 
the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶¶ 7-8 U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 
20, 2000). 
 10
in deployment, coordination, and making the missions operational.41  The United Nations 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was set up by the United Nations Security Council in March 
2005.42  Its mandate was to support the implementation of the Southern Sudan 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.43  The African Union-United Nations Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID), an AU/UN hybrid operation and one of the largest UN missions ever, 
was established by the Security Council in July 2007 to bolster the African Union (AU) 
mission in Darfur which had been operating there since 2004.44  Its mission is to oversee 
the implementation of Darfur peace agreements and to protect civilians.45  The first 
mission deployed in Sudan under the leadership of the AU faced enormous challenges 
with equipment, which negatively impacted their effectiveness.  Soon after the AU 
deployed forces, rebels drove into an AU base in eastern Darfur, stole technical 
equipment and weapons, and killed ten Nigerian peacekeepers.46  Poorly equipped and 
outfitted, the AU soldiers did not have a chance.  They could not defend themselves 
adequately nor could they hunt their attackers; the peacekeepers did not have helicopters 
to do that.  The deployment situation has since improved, as the mission was transformed 
into a UN/AU hybrid mission but peacekeeping efforts have been limited as the mission 
                                                 
41
 Centre for Conflict Resolution, Stabilizing Sudan: Domestic, Sub-Regional and Extra-Regional 
Challenges 3 (2010). 
42
 S.C. Res. 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005). 
43
 The 10,000 strong UN mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) which was launched to support the implementation 
of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Government of Sudan 
and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army faced many 
challenges.  DANIEL LARGE & CHRIS SAUNDERS, STABILIZING SUDAN: DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND 
EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES 7 (2010).  
44
 S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007). 
45
 On July 31, 2007, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1769 authorizing the 
deployment of a 26,000 strong United Nations-African Union force to help implement peace agreements.  
S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).  In Part 15(a)(ii), the resolution invoked Chapter 7 
to authorize UNAMID’s use of force to protect civilians.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
46
 Alexander Schwabe, Failure Looms for Darfur Peacekeepers, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Nov. 23, 2007, http:// 
www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,5193330,00.html. 
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lacks a peace agreement to implement.47  The mission remains a peacekeeping mission in 
the midst of ongoing conflict.  The demands of United Nations peacekeeping will always 
test the will of the international community to promote peace and security in the world’s 
conflict areas.  Despite widespread recognition that, in order to be effective, United 
Nations peacekeeping needs the concrete contributions of the member states in the form 
of personnel, finances, and political support, the international community invariably fails 
to meet the needs of peacekeeping operations.48 
 As the UN peacekeeping enterprise declined after the Somalia failure, the United 
States started to promote “regional” approaches to peacekeeping, particularly through 
NATO.49  The Clinton administration deployed U.S. military personnel to Kosovo, first 
as part of a NATO air operation to force the withdrawal of Yugoslavia troops from 
Kosovo, and next as part of a NATO peacekeeping force.50  But after the war in Kosovo 
in spring of 1999, broad opposition to unilateral peacekeeping led to a revival of the UN 
variety of peacekeeping.51  Major new UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) missions in 
East Timor,52 Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and the Congo brought another surge in 
                                                 
47
 Center for Conflict Resolution, Stabilizing Sudan: Domestic, Sub-Regional, and Extra-Regional 
Challenges 8 (2010). 
48
 Schwabe, supra note 46. 
49
 Sarah B. Sewall, U.S. Policy and Practice Regarding Multilateral Peace Operations, Carr Center for 
Human Rights Policy Working Paper 01-3 (2000).. 
50
 In the Balkans, the intervention in Kosovo was a NATO mission. 
51
 Richard Falk, Legality to Legitimacy: the Revival of the Just War Framework, HARV. INT’L REV., May 6, 
2006, http://hir.harvard.edu/interventionism/legality-to-legitimacy. 
52
 The United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) was established on June 11, 1999 and ended on 
October 25, 1999.  East Timor – UNMISET – Background, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/ background.html.  A second mission, United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), was established to administer the territory.  
Id.  At independence UNTAET was succeeded by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), 
established by Security Council resolution 1410 of May 17, 2002 to provide assistance to core 
administrative structures critical to the validity and political stability in East Timor.  S.C. Res. 1410, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1410 (May 17, 2002). 
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international peacekeeping.53  Today there are almost 124,000 personnel serving 
hundreds of millions of people around the world.54  There are a total of 16 peacekeeping 
missions in place, including seven in Africa, one in the Americas, two in Asia, three in 
Europe, and three in the Middle East.  This represents a nine-fold increase in UN 
peacekeeping since 1999.55 
There can be no dispute that United Nations peacekeeping missions have had 
mixed results.  There have been successes and failures.  Mozambique, Cambodia, and 
East Timor are examples of successful transitions from conflict to stable states.  A 
troubling aspect is that there have been cases where second missions have been 
necessary, such as in Liberia and Haiti.56  It is important, therefore, to examine the 
problems faced by peacekeeping missions and consider how best to organize them to 
effectively promote peace and development to troubled parts of the world.  
 Given the potentially unlimited scope of activities that can be encompassed by the 
term “peacekeeping mission,” it is useful to examine the categories of missions 
periodically undertaken by the United Nations.  There are two policy documents that 
define the nature of peacekeeping operations: An Agenda for Peace57 and the Brahimi 
                                                 
53
 Both Liberia and Haiti have had repeat missions.  See Charles Arthur, Building Peace in Haiti, 4 U.N. 
Chronicle 69 (2000-2001); ADEBAJO, supra note 38, at 43. 
54
 UN Peacekeeping Background Note, http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2010/factsheet.pdf. 
55
 Id. 
56
 U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
Keeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992) (hereinafter An 
Agenda for Peace).  After the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) brokered a 
peace agreement in 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 
(UNOMIL) by resolution 866 in 1993.  The mission was completed in 1997.  The war resumed.  After a 
peace agreement, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council 
resolution 1509 in 2003.  The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established by resolution 867 
in 1993.  The crisis resumed in 2004 and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was 
established by resolution 1542 in 2004.  Id. 
57
 Id.  
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Report.58  Peacekeeping has evolved rapidly in the past decade from the traditional, 
primarily military model of observing ceasefires and forcing separation after interstate 
wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian working 
together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.  Boutouros-Boutorous 
Ghali, in his An Agenda for Peace, outlines five types of missions: (a) preventive 
diplomacy; (b) peace making; (c) peacekeeping; (d) peace enforcement; and (e) 
peacebuilding.59 
A. Preventive Diplomacy 
Through preventive diplomacy, the UN seeks to remove the sources of danger 
before violence erupts.  This means taking actions that are aimed at easing tensions 
before they result in conflict.  It also means early warning of impending conflicts based 
on information gathering and fact finding.  It is clear that early warning systems are not 
working as effectively as they should; otherwise, such tragic situations as Darfur could 
have been foreseen (and prevented).  Rather, it seems that civil society (non-
governmental organizations and the media) often do a better job than the UN system.  
Indeed, it was the NGO Human Rights Watch that first warned the world about Darfur.60  
To effectively provide early warning, the UN would need (improved?) capacity in both 
information gathering and analysis of information.  
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However, it bears noting that, even when information has been available, 
responses to outbreaks of conflict have been slow, often hobbled by conflicting foreign 
policy interests of Security Council members and the reluctance of states to incur the 
human, material, and financial cost of United Nations intervention.61  Perhaps the clearest 
and most cited example of this is the failure to act in Rwanda.  It is well known that the 
UN Force Commander in Rwanda, General Dallaire, on January 11, 1994, wrote to then-
Secretary-General Kofi Annan informing him of information received indicating that 
Hutu extremists were preparing to exterminate Tutsis and that major arms caches could 
be identified by the informant.  General Daillaire stated that his forces were prepared to 
act.  Annan’s response was that Dallaire was not to confront the extremist, as that was not 
within his mandate.62  Thus, capacity to provide early warning may be rendered moot if 
not met with the willingness to act upon such information — and prevent or at least 
mitigate the warned-about crises.  
B. Peace Making 
Peace making falls between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and keeping 
the peace; it involves efforts to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means.  
Peace making addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using 
the tools of diplomacy and mediation.  Peacemakers may be envoys of governments, 
groups of states, regional organizations, or the United Nations; peacemakers may 
likewise be unofficial and non-governmental groups, as was the case in Mozambique, 
where negotiations leading to a peace accord were led by a team of four non-UN 
                                                 
61 DOBBINS, supra note 3, at 9.  An example is the delayed response to the Rwanda genocide in 1994.  See 
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(2004). 
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personnel.63  Peace making may even be the work of a prominent personality, working 
independent of or with the UN, such as George Mitchell, Jr.’s work in Northern Ireland 
or Kofi Annan’s work in Kenya.  More specifically, as a U.S. Special Envoy to Northern 
Ireland, George Mitchell, Jr. chaired all party negotiations leading to the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998.64  For his part, Kofi Annan chaired the Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities, which led the peace process following Kenya’s post-election violence in 
2007,65 bringing about a peace agreement after the country was at the brink of collapse.66 
C. Peacekeeping  
At another level, peacekeeping is when conflict has broken out and the UN 
intervenes in order to assist in keeping peace; such initiatives aim to create space for the 
parties to negotiate a settlement.  Examples include peacekeeping missions in South 
Africa, Haiti, Liberia, Balkans, and East Timor.67   Typically, the UN deploys a large 
force to keep the parties apart and enforce whatever peace accords to which the parties 
agree.  In most cases, in the interest of speed, the United Nations allows an international 
force or a country to act on its behalf before it deploys.  For example, in East Timor and 
Haiti, the United Nations allowed the Australian government and the United States 
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government, respectively, to deploy troops before the UN deployed.68  Such an approach 
is more time efficient, given that the United Nations does not have a standing army, and it 
therefore always takes a while before it can assemble and deploy a peacekeeping force.  
Notably, the speed at which deployment proceeds depends entirely on troop contributions 
from member states and the timely availability of resources to finance the mission.69 
D. Peace Enforcement 
This constitutes a type of military activity that, while coercive in nature, remains 
distinct from war.  The concept of peace enforcement rests on the premise that force is 
being used to enforce a mandate.  An example would be the use of force in Sierra Leone 
to make the rebels abide by the peace agreements they had signed.  It is also found in 
country doctrines.  According to the UK military doctrine, peace enforcement initiatives 
are neither in support of nor against a particular party, but are designed to restore peace 
and ensure compliance with the mandate in an evenhanded manner.70  The problem with 
peace enforcement is always going to be how to ensure that the use of force will not 
influence the political dynamics of the conflict.  The side against whom the enforcement 
is being carried out is likely to view the United Nations peacekeepers as enemies.  
Accordingly, a UN report encourages caution in the use of the peace enforcement option, 
warning that it “was impossible to stop a war by spreading it.”71  The solution is to expect 
                                                 
68
 United Nations Foundation, Keeping the Peace: A Brief Guide to UN Peacekeeping, UNF Insight: New 
Ideas for International Cooperation. 
69
 New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs, 111th Cong. 70-77 (2009) (testimony of Erin A. Weir). 
70
 See MINISTRY OF DEF, JWP 3-50, THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (2d ed. 
June 2004).  
71
 Rep. of the Special Comm. on Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly, Comprehensive Review of 
the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶ 20 U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 20, 
2000). 
 17
the Force Commander to excise good judgment as to when an enforcement measure 
would be appropriate. 
 
E. Peacebuilding 
 Peacebuilding is a term of more recent origin that defines activities undertaken on 
the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for 
building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.72  This 
occurs after both a ceasefire and a political settlement have been reached.  In other words, 
in these cases, the parties have already agreed upon their solution to the conflict.  These 
types of operations incorporate a substantial number of civilians alongside the military 
component.  Thus peacebuilding is not limited to demobilizing and reintegrating former 
combatants into civilian society; peacebuilding also includes building institutions of 
governance, building a civil service and the judiciary, and strengthening the rule of law 
(for example, through training and restructuring of local police and judicial and penal 
reform).  Peacebuilding further includes improving respect for human rights through the 
monitoring of, education on, and investigation of past and existing abuses and providing 
technical assistance for democratic transition (including electoral assistance and support 
for the development of free media and civil society, as well as promoting conflict 
resolution and reconciliation techniques).  In Somalia, the Security Council, in March 
1993, envisaged a role for UNOSOM II that involved far more than simply the 
continuation of the first mission which was charged with securing an environment for 
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humanitarian assistance.73  Indeed, Boutros Ghali called for a mandate that “would also 
empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their 
shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing, and recreating a Somali 
state based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country’s economy and 
infrastructure.”74  Another example is East Timor.  On October 25, 1999, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1271, establishing the UN Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET), with overall legislative and executive authority, including the 
administration of justice.75  The Resolution included provisions to provide security and 
maintain law and order; establish an effective administration; assist in the development of 
civil and social services; ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
rehabilitation, and development assistance; support capacity building for self-
government; and assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.76 
The United Nations has created the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC),77 the 
Peacebuilding Fund (PBF),78 and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)79 to address 
the needs of peacebuilding in countries emerging from conflict.  These institutions form a 
key addition to the capacity of the international community in terms of a broader peace 
agenda.  The Peacebuilding Commission brings together all the relevant actors (including 
international donors, international financial institutions, national governments, and troop-
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contributing countries); marshals resources; advises on and proposes integrated strategies 
for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; and, where appropriate, highlights gaps that 
threaten to undermine peace.80  The mandate of the Commission is comprised of three 
objectives: (1) to promote post-conflict peacebuilding through mobilizing relevant actors 
both within and outside the UN and to devise strategies and identify the resources 
necessary for the promotion of post-conflict reconstruction; (2) to help bridge the gap 
between the immediate post-conflict phase and sustainable peace through the 
identification of relevant public institutions to support recovery and economic 
development; and (3) to provide a monitoring and review function to facilitate 
information sharing among all parties concerned.81  The Commission funds projects and 
helps in building institutions that promote economic development and good governance.  
The PBC has four criteria for funding projects: (a) respond to imminent threats to peace 
processes and initiatives that support peace agreements and political dialogue; (b) build 
national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict; (c) 
stimulate economic revitalization to generate peace dividends; and (d) establish essential 
administrative services.82 
III. THE MANDATE AND THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION 
In any peacekeeping mission the mandate serves as the constitution of the 
operation.  A peacekeeping83 mandate informs a peacekeeping operation (PKO).  
Although scholars and practitioners use the term “mandate” in different ways, for the 
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purposes of this article, “mandate” refers to the broad objectives and specific instructions 
that define, limit, and guide a peacekeeping operation.  Although it varies by 
peacekeeping operation, there is generally not one document that provides the complete 
mandate of a peacekeeping operation.  Instead, the mandate is found in Security Council 
resolutions, the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council, and relevant peace 
agreements relating to the mission.  What peacekeepers are authorized, obligated, 
inclined, and equipped to do is, in large part, determined by these documents.  In fact, 
much of what is known by the public about peacekeeping mandates is how little a given 
mandate has authorized the peacekeepers to use force and equipped them to protect 
civilians.  We can all remember how peacekeepers in Rwanda cried desperately for a 
more robust peacekeeping mandate that would allow them to use force defensively as 
well as offensively to carry out their tasks as outlined in the mandate.  Recall the story of 
General Derille, the Canadian Force commander in Rwanda, and his famous fax to UN 
headquarters.84 
One of the weaknesses of the process of developing a mandate is that many of the 
actors involved in the creation and development of the mandate are not acquainted with 
how other actors involved in the same process operate.  This is partly due to the fact that 
the process behind the creation of a mandate is often ad hoc, disjointed, and 
unpredictable.  The key actors are the Security Council members and the donor states that 
are responsible for the funding of the mandate.  A typical UN mandate contains the 
following elements: a background to the situation being addressed, the objective of the 
mission, the powers of the mission, the tasks to be implemented, the rules of engagement, 
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and sometimes the mechanisms to be used to implement the mandate.  For example, 
Resolution 772, which in 1992 set up the United Nations Observer Mission in South 
Africa (UNOMSA), called upon UNOMSA “to strengthen and reinforce the indigenous 
mechanisms set up under the National Peace Accords, so as to enhance their capacity in 
the building of peace, both in the present and in the future,”85 and  Resolution 1769 
setting up the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) invokes 
Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter to authorize UNAMID’s use of force to protect 
civilians.86 
Developing a mandate is an inherently political process.  Often, Security Council 
members receive instructions from their capitals and make rigid proposals with little 
flexibility.  The process is not inclusive of other member states of the United Nations 
who are given no avenues to influence the process.87  Importantly, mandates are both 
legal and political in nature.  As such, while the language employed by the mandate 
drafters can have legal consequences, the rationale behind this language is almost 
completely politically driven.  The drafting of a mandate involves many actors, ranging 
from Security Council members to the warring factions of the host country88 to officers 
from the United Nations political and peacekeeping departments.  Mandates are a result 
of consensus among the parties involved in its development — which parties are not 
necessarily directly involved in the conflict.  Mandates’ objectives range from assisting in 
implementing a comprehensive peace agreement to preventing an outbreak of conflict 
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and delivering humanitarian relief supplies, to administering a territory for a transitional 
period and conducting elections.89 
The mandate of a peacekeeping operation must be distinguished from the legal 
basis regulating the implementation of the mandate.  The legal framework is founded on 
the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that is concluded between the United Nations 
and host state.90 Among other things, the SOFA allows the establishment of the mission; 
importation of equipment and flying rights; and incorporates the privileges and 
immunities of the peacekeepers which define the legal limits that peacekeepers are bound 
to when implementing a mandate’s broad objectives and specific instructions.  For 
example, while a mandate will include a request for ceasefire verification, the legal 
framework will ensure operational needs of the mission and that, unless the United 
Nations waves immunity, in the event any peacekeeper commits a crime during such the 
duration of the mission, he or she will not be subject to the host state’s legal systems.91  
The SOFA sets specific terms for the conduct, privileges, immunities, and jurisdictions of 
the military and civilian employees on matters such as criminal and civil jurisdiction.92 
SOFAs provide for immunity for peacekeepers from local jurisdictions and establish 
exclusive jurisdiction of the troop-contributing peacekeepers’ nation of origin.93  These 
are important norms without which peacekeeping missions could not operate effectively.  
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Host states could easily frustrate the work of missions by subjecting them to sham 
prosecutions and harassment to impede their work. 
Immunities for United Nations workers are grounded in articles 104 and 105 of 
the UN Charter.  These articles provide that the UN and its staff enjoy such privileges 
and immunities in territories of member states as are necessary for the independent 
exercise of their function.94  They give immunity to the United Nations and its 
employees, including peacekeepers, when operating in foreign territory.95  While the 
founders of the United Nations did not intend that the privileges and immunities of 
officials should constitute a shield from national criminal prosecution for crimes 
committed in a state hosting the UN operation where crimes have clearly been 
committed, the International Court of Justice has held that personnel employed directly 
by the United Nations on mission receive functional immunity from prosecution for acts 
committed while executing their duties.96 
It bears noting that, while the SOFA guarantees the legality of the peacekeepers’ 
conduct on the territory of a sovereign country and outlines the conditions under which 
the force shall operate in the host state,97 the Rules of Engagement (ROE) provide the 
armed forces the authority for the use of force, delineating the circumstances and 
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limitations under which the peacekeepers may initiate or continue combat engagement 
when encountering other forces.98 
The elaboration of a mandate relies on the Secretary-General’s report of the 
situation in the host state.  Typically, prior to the conclusion of the preparation of the 
report the Secretary-General sends a special envoy to the area to get first-hand 
information about the situation on the ground.  For example, in the case of UNOMSA 
following South Africa’s Baipatong massacres on June 17, 1992, the Security Council 
unanimously adopted (on July 16, 1992) Resolution 765 by which it, inter alia, invited 
the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for South Africa to recommend 
— after discussion with the parties in the country — measures which would assist in 
bringing an effective end to the violence and in creating conditions for negotiations 
leading to a peaceful transition to a democratic, non-racial, and united South Africa.99  
The Secretary-General appointed Cyrus R. Vance as his special representative to South 
Africa.  Following Vance’s report, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the 
Security Council, which led to the adoption of Resolution 772 on August 17, 1992.  
Resolution 772 formed the mandate of UNOMSA.100 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the degree of reliance placed on the Secretary-General’s 
report by the Security Council will depend on the nature and clarity of the report.  That is, 
a report that describes the situation on the ground and frames the issues but does not 
suggest approaches to addressing these issues will be helpful for the drafting of the 
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mandate but will not become the actual mandate.  It stands to reason that the most useful 
Secretary-General reports are those that clearly identify the issues and suggest solutions.  
However, some reports — even those that present issues and solutions — may not 
become part of the mandate because the Security Council members’ resources and 
interests do not coincide with the requests or suggestions made by the Secretary-General 
in the report.  
 After the adoption of the mandate, the Secretary-General sends one or more 
Technical Assessment Missions (TAM) to develop a concept of operations for the 
mission, assess the situation on the ground, and determine the local dynamics of the 
situation.101  Typically, a small TAM is sent before the mandate is finalized to assess the 
financial and technical implications of deploying mission and a more fully-fledged TAM 
is sent after the adoption of the mandate.102  TAMs will generally include representatives 
from the DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS).103 The representatives of the 
DPKO may include, depending on the purpose of the TAM: the Office of Operations, the 
Office of Military Affairs, and the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions 
(including the Police Division, the DDR Section, and the Mine Action Service).104  
Increasingly, TAMs include representatives of other UN agencies, such as the UNDP, 
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UNICEF, OCHA, OHCHR, UNHCR and UNAIDS.105  While in the country, the TAM 
meets with all stakeholders, including NGOs.  
 As was noted previously, many peace agreements form the basis of the 
peacekeeping mandate such that either the mandate includes provisions of the peace 
agreement or the mandate provides for the implementation of the peace agreement.  In 
those situations, the United Nations (through the peacekeeping operation) has as its 
mandate the implementation of the peace agreement, such as was the case in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan.106 
An issue that often arises in both developing the mandate and in peacekeeping 
operations is the extent to which the United Nations can use neighboring countries as 
partners in both processes.  The use of neighbors has its advantages.  As Mark Malan 
points out “neighbors are more familiar with each other’s problems than outsiders.  
Neighbors usually have a fairly common culture, a common social identity, a common 
history and experiences.”107  In the Namibian peace process, neighboring states — the 
“frontline states” as they called themselves — played a significant role in facilitating the 
agreement that became the basis of the Namibian peace process.108  In 1977, a pressure 
group, the Western Contact Group, was formed and included Canada, France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States.109  The group launched a joint diplomatic 
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effort to bring an internationally acceptable transition to independence for Namibia.110  
The Western Contact Group’s efforts led to the presentation in 1978 of Security Council 
Resolution 435 for settling the Namibian problem.111  The settlement proposal, as it 
became known, was worked out after lengthy consultation with South Africa and the 
Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).112  
The disadvantage to the involvement of neighboring states is that proximity sometimes 
can mean that the “neighbors” are not neutral and, at worst, they can be involved in the 
conflict.  This was the case in the Congo in the 1990s following the removal of the 
Mobutu regime, where a number of neighbors (Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and 
Angola) intervened militarily in the conflict and became part of the problem.113  
On many occasions, one of the Security Council permanent members—or another 
member state—will take the lead in designing and drafting a particular PKO mandate.114  
The sponsoring member state writes the first draft of the mandate, which is subsequently 
circulated to the Security Council.115  This tends to happen in cases where the member 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112
 United Nations Transitional Group (UNTAG) was established in 1978 with a mandate of assisting the 
Special Representative of the  Secretary-General to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and 
fair elections under the UN.  See S.C. Res. 435, U.N. Doc. S/RES/435 (Sept. 29, 1978).  For a detailed 
discussion of the role of the Frontline States in the settlement of the Namibian problem, see GILBERT M. 
KHADIAGALA, ALLIES IN ADVERSITY: THE FRONTLINE STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECURITY, 1975-
1993 (1994).  
113 WORLD POLICY INSTITUTE, REPORT: U.S. ARMS TO AFRICA AND THE CONGO WAR-WORLD POLICY 
INSTITUTE-RESEARCH PROJECT (2000), http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/Congo.htm. 
114
 See Nigeria and France Introduce UN Resolution Calling for Sanctions Against Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo, 
Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5869:france-
and-nigeria-introduce-un-resolution-calling-for-sanctions-against-ivory-coasts-gbagbo&catid=1:latest-
news&Itemid=67; and Louis Charbonneau & Patrick Worsnip, France Asks UN Security Council to 
Sanction Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo, Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/25/us-ivorycoast-
france-un-idUSTRE72O6KR20110325. 
115
 See Nigeria and France Introduce UN Resolution Calling for Sanctions Against Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo, 
Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5869:france-
and-nigeria-introduce-un-resolution-calling-for-sanctions-against-ivory-coasts-gbagbo&catid=1:latest-
news&Itemid=67; and Louis Charbonneau & Patrick Worsnip, France Asks UN Security Council to 
 28
state has a strong interest in ensuring that the PKO successfully solves the conflict.  For 
example, the United States took the lead in drafting the mandates for both UNMIH 
(Haiti) and UNITAF (Somalia), France took the lead in drafting UNOCI’s (Cote 
D’Ivoire) mandate, France and the U.S. together took the lead in drafting Lebanon’s 
UNIFIL, and the EU and other European states together took the lead in drafting 
UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina).116 
After the sponsor nation finalizes the drafting of the mandate (in the form of a 
Security Council resolution draft), informal consultations begin.  There is no official 
record of this process.  During this meeting, the Security Council reviews the draft as 
well as the full Secretary-General report and the peace agreement (if there is one) and 
decides what sections to include in the mandate.  Once the Security Council has 
extensively reviewed the mandate, formal consultations begin.  At this point, the Security 
Council member states publicly explain their decision to either support, abstain, or veto 
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the Security Council resolution.117  There a is a strong view that the Security Council 
should involve troop-contributing countries in the consultation process regarding the 
establishment or renewal of the mandate of a peacekeeping operation in a more 
meaningful manner and from the outset of the mandate’s elaboration.118 
 
A. Modification of Mandates  
Mandates frequently change or are supplemented.  A peacekeeping mission may 
find that its mandate is deficient at the time of initial deployment or that the mandate does 
not address issues that have emerged since deployment.  It is always a challenge to assess 
— prior to deployment — how the mandate will work and how warring factions, troops, 
and civil society will react to the mission.  It is thus natural that once the PKO is 
deployed in the field, its mandate should be revised to reflect local needs.  In fact, the 
most successful missions are those that are flexible and easily adaptable to the needs on 
the ground.119  This flexibility is particularly important to ensure that the mandate and 
mission remain relevant to the conditions prevailing in the conflict state.  In South Africa, 
for example, Resolution 772 — which did not include an electoral component — was 
supplemented by Resolution 894 to respond to the request of the Transitional Executive 
Council that the United Nations provide a sufficient number of international observers to 
monitor the electoral process and to coordinate the activities of the international 
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observers provided by the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth, and the 
European Union as well as by governments.120 
 There are several reasons why PKO mandates change.  First, some missions do 
not get feedback from the ground until the PKO is deployed — due to, for example, lack 
of access to the country because of fighting or hostility from the warring factions.  Thus, 
it is not until they are in the host country that PKO officials can fully grasp what is 
occurring locally.  Frequently, changes are simply due to the fact that a specific task 
within the mandate is fulfilled and thus replaced by an updated one.  As an example, once 
disarmament has occurred, a PKO may be required to aid in the reintegration of the ex-
combatants into society.  Furthermore, PKOs do not receive all the necessary resources 
for full implementation and therefore must constantly change their strategies depending 
on how many troops and the level of financial support received.  In fact, many PKOs find 
that their donors and initial supporters lack the political will initially promised, which in 
turn leads to false expectations.  Finally, regardless of such shortcomings, conflicts are 
characteristically unpredictable, requiring constant adaptation. 
As rightly observed in an United Nations report, when changes are made to 
existing mandates, commensurate changes should be made to the resources available to 
the peacekeeping operation to carry out its new mandate.121  Changes should be based on 
a thorough assessment of the situation after full consultation with the Security Council 
and troop-contributing states.122  Revisions to a mandate may be implemented by the 
Security Council passing a new resolution that formally modifies or adds to the PKO 
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mandate.  For example, the mission initially dispatched to Bosnia-Herzegovina was not 
meant to end any war, but rather to deliver humanitarian aid.123  As Kofi Annan 
explained, the “nature of the conflict, including ‘ethnic cleansing’ and concentration 
camps, seemed to call for something more ambitious.”124  UNPROFOR soon found itself 
containing the conflict with measures such as an arms embargo and a no-fly zone to 
promote a ceasefire.  However, this change, and many other changes in mandates, did not 
occur with widespread agreement.  In fact, on May 30, 1994, Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali argued for a revision of the UNPROFOR mandate “so that it would 
include only those tasks that a peacekeeping operation could be reasonably expected to 
perform in the circumstances prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”125 
A shift that has occurred on several occasions with peacekeeping operations is moving 
from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII mandate.126  This occurred in the UN Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999-2005) and in the UN Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, 2000-present) due to a deteriorating 
security situation on the ground.127  The new mandates authorize the PKO to take “the 
necessary action” to ensure freedom of movement and protection of civilians.128  Other 
shifts require the creation of an entirely new peacekeeping operation the necessary 
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change is so drastic that modifying an already existing mandate may not be enough.  This 
occurred in Somalia between 1992-95 in the transition from UNOSOM I to UNITAF to 
UNOSOM II.  Somalia experienced a mixture of peacekeeping, peace making, peace 
enforcement, and nation-building.129  UNOSOM I began as a mission to support 
humanitarian relief, but was soon overwhelmed by the Somali warlords.130  Even with a 
Chapter VII mandate, the PKO lacked the force of arms and thus had to transition into a 
full-fledged military operation that did not resolve the Somali crisis.131  The United 
Nations does not presently have a peacekeeping mission in Somalia.  It has authorized an 
African Union Mission (AMISOM).132  Unfortunately, the Somalia crisis continues as a 
Humans Right Watch report observes: “Somalia is nation in ruins, mired in one of the 
world’s most brutal armed conflicts of recent years.”133  IV. CONDITIONS AND 
FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE SUCCESS 
OF A PEACEKEEPING MISSION 
 This section identifies critical factors that impact on the success of a mission.  
Most of the conflicts are characterized by the combination of internal and international 
factors in the conflict with serious human rights violations and large scale suffering 
among the threatened civilian population, which inevitably results in large numbers of 
refugees and displaced persons.  Very often, conflict is a symptom of an intrastate crisis 
that is deeply rooted in the following conditions: authoritarian rule; exclusion of 
minorities from governance; socio-economic deprivation; and weak state structures that 
                                                 
129
 See MURPHY, supra note 89, at 48. 
130 Id. at 33. 
131 Id. at 35. 
132
 S.C. Res. 1964, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1964 (Dec. 22, 2010). 
133
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, REPORT: SO MUCH TO FEAR: WAR CRIMES AND THE DEVASTATION OF 
SOMALIA 1 (2008). 
 33
lack the capacity to handle normal political and social conflict.134  Against this 
background — and cognizant that generalizations can be dangerous — a number of 
factors seem to determine the success of an intervention:  cooperation of the parties 
implementing the mandate; continuing support of the Security Council; readiness of the 
states to provide financial, technical, and materials resources to the mission; the need to 
deal with both past and current human rights violations; the need to deal with gender 
issues; and leadership of the mission.  Each of these issues warrants discussion.  
 A good mandate should be clear and practical and be backed by secure funding.  
In order to structure a clear mandate there must be a clear understanding of the nature of 
the problem and the underlying cause.  The strategic implication of this is that in 
structuring mandates and UN missions, we must focus on the structural causes of conflict 
in order to build a solid foundation for peace and ensure a future free of conflicts.  For 
example, in the case of Liberia, poverty, authoritarian rule, and the old conflict between 
Americo-Liberians and indigenous Liberians documented by J. Gus Liebenow in his 
1969 book Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege, has contributed significantly to the crises 
Liberia has experienced.135  In Afghanistan, poverty, authoritarian rule by the warlords 
and the Taliban, and denial of basic human rights are major factors that contributed to the 
ignition of the crisis situation that continues today.  In present-day Darfur, religious 
tensions and the attempt by the Arab population to ethnically cleanse the North of the 
black Sudanese population are significant factors in the conflict.  Such crisis situations 
underscore that political stability requires structural accommodation of diversity.  In other 
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words, for the purpose of devising UN mandates and missions, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the symptoms and causes of intrastate crises.  Peacekeeping efforts 
which treat the symptoms rather than sources of conflict lack a built-in exit strategy and 
often lead to failure.  The Somali crisis is often given as an example of this phenomenon.  
 Unfortunately, the resources and energies of the international community tend to 
be mobilized around the symptoms — rather than the causes — of conflicts.  As a result, 
traditional peacekeepers have remained in place for several decades, such as in Cyprus 
and the India/Pakistan border.  It must also be taken into account that peacekeeping 
increasingly involves internal wars with armed elements only partially under the control 
of those who consent to a United Nations deployment.  In these cases, it might be 
necessary to first stabilize the situation before a peacekeeping operation can be deployed, 
as was the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  In some contemporary post-conflict 
situations, peacekeeping forces may need the ability to use force, if necessary, to keep the 
initiative of the peace process on track and to defend the peacekeeping mission and its 
mandate.  A clear mandate must address the need to use force in such circumstances.  The 
Eastern Congo is an example of a situation where the use of force was necessary to 
confront the militias terrorizing the civilian population.  
 The mandate must be guided by the understanding that peace making and 
peacebuilding are primarily the responsibility of local rather than foreign actors.  
Although it may seem counterintuitive, the UN peacekeeping operations may be more 
effective when the UN is not intricately involved in the peace negotiations at the outset of 
the talks.  In Cambodia in the 1990s, the contours of the mission were sketched out at an 
array of informal meetings that allowed all the relevant regional actors to make their 
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preferences known.136  As a result, even though the interests of Vietnam and China were 
diametrically opposed throughout the negotiations process, the UN mandate was able to 
avoid association with the dispute and to assume some semblance of impartiality.  
Similarly, in the South African peace process, local stakeholders negotiated a settlement 
and the UN helped implement it through monitoring the peace accord structures and 
supporting the elections process in 1994.137  Such successful examples highlight that the 
peace process must seek ways of involving the local people in all aspects of its operations 
to the fullest extent.  It must also seek to involve regional actors.   
 Involvement of regional actors is important and holds relatively untapped 
potential for the UN.  The current missions in Sudan and Somalia are examples of a 
growing collaboration between the UN and the Africa Union.  Regional actors can help 
players reach solutions compatible with local traditions and can act as guarantors to the 
peace process.  Clearly, such interactions will require a greater amount of trust on the 
parts of both the United Nations and regional actors.  Regional actors are sometimes 
skeptical of the United Nations’ intentions.  On the other hand, the United Nations has 
experienced difficulties in relation to capacities on the part of regional actors, and even 
regional organizations face problems of capacity.138  The AU Mission in Darfur which 
preceded the current UN/AU mission, for example, was financed almost entirely by the 
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European Union and the United Nations.139  Until western states came to the AU’s aid, 
the AU faced considerable difficulties in meeting the needs of the mission in Sudan as 
African armies lacked essential equipment such as helicopters and logistics equipment.   
 Nonetheless, a key advantage to involving regional actors is that neighbors are 
more familiar than outsiders are with each other’s problems.  The disadvantage is that 
close proximity reduces impartiality and heightens the risk of involvement.140  There is 
also the problem of differences over applicable values.  A recent example is the sharp 
differences in the views held by the United Nations and the African Union over the 
indictment of Bashir by the International Criminal Court.  To maximize the benefits, 
cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations must be based on 
strict observance of the principles and ideals of the United Nations Charter.  
 In developing a mandate, as a political body, the Security Council focuses on 
consensus building, even though it can make decisions with less than unanimity.  But 
very often, the compromise required to build consensus can be made at the expense of 
specificity, and the resulting ambiguity can have serious consequences in the field if the 
mandate is then subject to varying interpretations.  The worst example of the 
consequences of an inadequate mandate is the Rwanda Genocide.  There was a lack of 
clarity as to whether peacekeeping or peace enforcement was needed.  There is general 
agreement that had action been taken in Rwanda, the genocide could very well have been 
averted.  Because an inadequate mandate could lead to the UN itself exacerbating a 
problem, it is crucial that peacekeeping missions are given robust mandates.   
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 It is important to emphasize that, in circumstances where a party to a peace 
agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of 
all parties by the UN can, in the best case, result in ineffectiveness — and in the worst 
may amount to complicity with evil.  The UN is not a neutral actor and should not be; it 
is an organization guided by the core values of the United Nations Charter.  Impartiality 
does not mean neutrality.  Neutrality in the face of violations of the UN Charter norms 
only rewards the transgressors.  No failure did more to damage the standing and 
credibility of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from 
aggressor in such missions as the Congo in the 1960s.  
 At a practical level, once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out 
their mandates professionally and successfully.  This means that UN military units must 
be capable of defending themselves, other mission components, and the mission’s 
mandate.  Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force UN 
contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.  United Nations peacekeepers have 
often come under attack for failing to protect civilians.141  In the Sudan, for example, 
there are complaints that UNAMID is failing to protect civilians.142  The problem appears 
to be that UN forces often seek Sudanese authorization to move around the country and 
do not move unless they are given clearance by the host government.  Further, the United 
Nations takes the view that the primary responsibility to protect civilians lies with the 
countries concerned.143  This is an unrealistic approach that cannot advance the objectives 
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of the mandate and protect civilians.  Once the United Nations has a mandate and Status 
of Forces Agreement, the two documents should be the only guiding documents. 
  Peacekeeping missions cannot succeed unless the warring parties agree to 
cooperate in the implementation of the mandate.  Force alone cannot create peace; it can 
only create the space in which peace maybe established.  As a result, consent of the 
parties is the bedrock principle of peacekeeping operations.  The problem is that local 
parties sometimes sign peace accords for a variety of reasons — not all of them favorable 
to peace — there often “spoiler-groups” who renege on their commitments or otherwise 
seek to undermine a peace accord through violence.  In both Sierra Leone and Angola, 
the first peacekeeping operations did not produce lasting peace; in each country, 
challenged peace implementation threw the nation back into civil war.144 
 For peacekeeping to succeed in reducing tension and averting conflict, the UN 
needs clear, unwavering, strong, and sustained political support from the Security 
Council and member states.145  Lack of support can result in delays or impediments to 
taking action, as well as a lack of sufficient resources to effectively implement a course 
of action once it has been decided upon.  
A. Readiness of member states to contribute troops, personnel, and adequate financial 
and logistical support 
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 The United Nations is totally dependent on the contributions of member states for 
peacekeeping missions; the UN does not have a standing army or police force.146  As is 
well known, the UN continues to experience a troop commitment gap.  Industrial states 
tend to prioritize deployment of their troops to operations led by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization states (NATO), the European Union and/or ad hoc coalitions 
authorized by the Security Council.  Developing countries continued to provide the 
largest numbers of military and civilian police personnel for United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.147  The commitment gap often translates into delays in 
deployment.  Examples of the effect of delays is in Liberia, where the UN force was 
authorized in August 2003, but by March 2004 it still had not achieved its full strength, 
delaying key programs such as the disarmament of combatants.148 
 The speedy deployment of military, civil police, and civilian experts will not help 
to solidify peace and establish the credibility of an operation if these personnel are not 
equipped to do their job.  To be effective, the mission’s personnel need material, 
equipment, and logistical support.  The early days of the Sierra Leone mission provides a 
very clear example of what could happen when men and women are deployed without 
logistical support: lacking communications equipment and weapons to defend 
themselves, 500 United Nations peacekeepers were captured by rebel fighters in the early 
days of the Sierra Leone mission.149  Willingness by member states to contribute troops 
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to a credible operation also implies a willingness to accept the risk of casualties on behalf 
of the mandate; nevertheless, it is hard for countries to accept this reality.  
 The missions in Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, and East Timor can be 
considered successful missions in terms of supporting multiparty elections that resulted in 
the formation of broad-based representative governments.  Although these missions 
operated in completely dissimilar environments, they are a useful indicator of the 
conditions for success.  As previously discussed, these conditions can be roughly divided 
into two categories: the nature of the mandates and the resources available to each 
mission.    
 In terms of respective mandates, in Cambodia, Namibia, and Mozambique, the 
warring parties had concluded a peace agreement and welcomed UN involvement and 
deployment of a peacekeeping force.  Although it may seem obvious that a mission is 
more likely to succeed when opponents have already agreed upon a solution, it is 
important to note that this was not easily achieved at the outset in any of the three cases 
and was the result of intensive negotiations.  In Cambodia, Vietnam and the Khmer 
Rouge each remained determined to vanquish the other while their foreign suppliers were 
content to watch their proxies fight.  In Namibia, despite General Assembly and Security 
Council Resolutions, South Africa remained convinced for many years that a military 
victory over the guerrilla forces was possible.150  In Mozambique, a brutal war ranged for 
several years between FRELIMO and RENAMO as their backers were remained 
prepared to fund the conflict.  In each of these cases, serious negotiations began only 
after it became obvious to all parties involved in the conflict that a military stalemate had 
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resulted,151 thus lending serious weight to the idea that a critical element for successful 
peacekeeping is the realization that outright victory for either side is unlikely, and a 
sound peace agreement which has the support of all the parties to the conflict is the best 
case scenario.   
 An additional “success” factor in Cambodia, Namibia, and Mozambique was that 
the mandates of each mission and the respective peace settlement was negotiated 
primarily by outsiders, lending further credence to the view that UN peacekeeping 
operations are more likely to be effective when the UN is not intricately involved in the 
minute details of negotiations at the outset.  In Mozambique, the Vatican mediated the 
peace negotiations between FRELIMO and RANAMO, which led to a ceasefire and a 
peace agreement that the UN went in to implement.152  And, as already pointed out in the 
Cambodia case, the contours of the mission were sketched out at an array of informal 
meetings that allowed all of the relevant regional actors to make their preferences 
known.153  Likewise, in Namibia, the regional actors, through a group called the Front 
Line States, negotiated some of the terms of the peace settlement.154  These cases would 
suggest that regional blocks in some situations may be better incubators of UN mandates 
than the Security Council. 
B. Human Rights Violence — Current and Past 
 Conflict situations are characterized by lack of respect for the rule of law, gross 
human rights violations, and impunity.  In a post-conflict society, some of the most 
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difficult tasks include articulating a vision of a new society, dealing with past human 
rights violations, defining the fundamental principles by which the country will be 
transformed, and engaging in effective reconciliation.  The manner in which these 
processes are handled can play an important role in the consolidation of peace.  A 
peacekeeping mission must have a component within the peace process to develop 
mechanisms to address the development of a comprehensive program for national 
reconciliation.  Examples are the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions that have been 
established in various countries emerging from gross human rights violations.155 
 Indeed, there can be no lasting peace where a nation does not deal with its past 
and its citizens continue to be traumatized.  Each mission should have a humanitarian 
component to deal with the often tragic conditions that people in zones of conflict 
inhabit.  Many thousands of people are often driven from their homes in conflict zones.  
In fact, it is estimated that there are now over 25 million internally displaced people 
worldwide — outnumbering refugees by more than two to one.156  A humanitarian 
component will ensure a more coherent and strategically coordinated humanitarian 
response to the plight of internally displaced people.  Particular attention should be given 
to addressing the needs of children. 
C. Gender Component 
Similarly, a good peacekeeping mission should have a gender unit to ensure that 
gender equality in the mission, as well as the peace process, is mainstreamed.  Women 
have their own perspective and experiences to bring to conflict resolution, particularly in 
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light of the fact that women are disproportionately impacted by conflict.157  After all, 
what can be more democratic than to ensure that every voice is heard in the political 
process?  One way of ensuring that gender is a critical part of the mission is to start with 
the mission itself.  There should be increased participation of women at all levels of the 
mission.  As has been observed — including through Security Council Resolution 1325 
— mainstreaming gender into peacebuilding initiatives is critical to making societies 
more equitable and just.158  The inclusion of women in peacebuilding activities could 
help unshackle societies from patriarchy and promote a transformative agenda.  Such 
action must also facilitate the addressing of unequal power relations and gender 
inequality.159  The very first all-female peacekeeping force was deployed in Liberia in 
2007.160  Since then, scores of women have helped to disengage armed forces, protect 
civilians, and promote human rights.  The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, has 
spoken about the positive impact women bring to peacekeeping, stating that “whether 
interviewing victims of sexual violence, working in women’s prisons, assisting female 
ex-combatants reintegrating into civilian life, or mentoring female police cadets, women 
personnel have a clear advantage.  They can help empower women to rebuild their war-
torn countries and act as role models.”161  Further, it has been noted that the presence of 
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women peacekeepers in Liberia is reducing the incidence of sexual exploitation.162  For 
all of these reasons, a serious and robust gender component should be prioritized as a 
central component to each peacekeeping mission — and should not be relegated to an 
after-thought or “soft issue.”  
D. Leadership of Mission 
Effective, dynamic leadership can make the difference between a cohesive 
mission with high morale and effectiveness despite adverse circumstances and one that 
struggles to maintain those attributes.  The tenor of an entire mission can be heavily 
influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it.  The heads of United Nations 
peacekeeping missions are unique in their ex officio ability to make or break a peace 
operation and because they may significantly enhance an operation’s credibility and 
effectiveness through measured judgment strength of character and on the ground 
acuity.163  It is widely acknowledged that the success of the Mozambique mission was 
due to the excellent leadership provided by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General Aldo Ajello.164  It is important, therefore, that careful attention be given to 
choosing heads of peacekeeping missions; proven leadership, judgment, and integrity are 
among the core attributes that must be sought and demonstrated.   
 V. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES IN A PEACEKEEPING MISSION            
 In addition to the challenges discussed above, peacekeeping missions encounter 
issues relating to security and disarmament of combatants and their reintegration into 
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society.  Peacebuilding makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order.  
But the basic objective of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is not met 
unless all three elements of the process are implemented.  These are always part of the 
major tasks that peacekeeping missions need to address.  As might be reasonably 
expected from the broad variety and scope of peacekeeping missions, the results over 
these issues have been mixed.  A number of conditions are necessary for a successful 
reconstruction, disarmament, and reintegration program.  Reconstruction is a critical 
objective for the long-term success of a mission.  David Keen makes the important point 
that when we talk about reconstruction it should be clear that it is not about 
reconstructing the exact social and economic conditions prevailing at the outset of a 
conflict that caused the problem in the first place.165  Failure to tackle the underlying 
grievance will be damaging in the long run.  Byron Tarr illustrates this point when he 
makes the argument that Liberia’s past efforts at reform are replete with failure because 
they all fail to address the underlying problems of marginalization of indigenous people, 
decentralization, and Liberia’s inability to decide whether it remains “an outpost of 
Western civilization” or is an African state desiring to be a responsible member of an 
integrating subregion.166 
 Disarmament and demobilization of former combatants are key to immediate 
post-conflict stability and reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence.  Indeed, 
disarmament is the smallest part of the peace process while reintegration is often a bigger 
problem.  Whether economic and political reconstruction can begin depends on how 
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quickly security spreads throughout the country.  Typically, the main spoilers are the 
politicians; the fighters are more committed to peace than their political masters.  
Demobilized fighters (who almost never fully disarm) will tend to return to a life of 
violence if they find no legitimate livelihood — that is, if they are not “reintegrated” into 
the local economy.  In the end, economic development is critical to sustained 
demobilization and the peace process.  Reintegration is a long-term matter that must be 
linked to jump starting the country’s economy and giving fighters hope of better 
prospects.  Money will be needed to assist in providing training, skills, and vocational 
education.  Jobs are an essential ingredient of an effective reintegration strategy that will 
be critical for breaking the ties of fighters to their political masters.  The typical approach 
is to train ex-fighters in various trades such as bricklaying and carpentry.  Without job 
opportunities to utilize the trades taught, the training does not provide real alternatives.  
An example of what can happen when there is no meaningful reintegration is East Timor 
in 2006, where ex-combatants rebelled and started fighting with the army.167  Patterns of 
development that empower ordinary people through jobs and access to education and 
improved security will weaken the position of warlords and extremist politicians who 
offer to meet these needs through violence and harassment of the people.   
 A separate challenge that should be considered in peacekeeping missions is that 
there is often too much focus on early elections in peace processes.  Elections are an 
important and necessary component of the democratic process, and most peace 
agreements call for elections early on in the process.  However, to conduct an election is 
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a logistically huge undertaking.  It requires security and capacity.  Warlords have 
demonstrated time and time again that they benefit most from a premature rush to the 
ballot box and from the sham legitimacy that it confers.  It must be borne in mind that an 
election is a contest — and a contest is necessarily combative.  Elections therefore 
require clear rules so that even the losers trust that the rules have been applied justly; 
otherwise, former enemies will continue their rivalry and contest by other means.  In 
cases where elections are premature and poorly organized, the heightened expectations 
surrounding the elections can become a dangerous force.  In such situations, elections do 
not guarantee democracy; they, in fact, can make matters worse.  In this regard, one need 
only look at the Liberian elections in the 1990s that brought Charles Taylor to power and 
legitimized his rule.168  
An additional problem is too much focus on leaders rather than ordinary people.  
UN peace processes are often built around leaders and do not pay sufficient attention to 
the ordinary people.  Typically, there is no parallel peace process on the ground.  The 
exception was South Africa, where Peace Accord Structures were established through 
legislation at national, regional, and local levels.169  The Structures, comprised of 
inclusive committees representing stakeholders at local community, district, and 
provincial levels, established and discussed the peace process and reconstruction of 
infrastructure damaged in political violence in the various communities.  These forums 
played a critical role in articulating the concerns of ordinary people and fed into the 
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national process.170  The local Structures enable communities to contribute to the 
maintenance of a secure local environment for peacebuilding and enable the 
peacebuilder’s task of supporting the political, social, and economic changes that create a 
secure, self-sustaining environment.  After all, the goal of international intervention 
should always be seen first and foremost as facilitating local processes, providing 
resources, and creating the local actors to resolve their own problems. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article has offered some suggestions on how peacekeeping missions can be 
made more effective.  The success of a mission will depend largely on whether there is a 
clear and responsive peacekeeping mandate and whether the mandate is supported by 
adequate resources and effective leadership.  Mandates are texts that are open to a certain 
degree of interpretation.  In that respect, peacekeeping missions must be prepared to 
adapt mandates to local conditions and missions must show flexibility.  At the same time, 
mandates must be interpreted in a more expansive manner.  Since it is usually up to  the 
Force Commander and the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to direct the 
implementation of  the mandate, they may do so by going beyond the initial narrowly 
defined objective of the mandate when the circumstances demand such departure.  They 
should be informed by conditions on the ground.  In that respect, the peacekeepers must 
view the mandate as a floor rather than a ceiling.  This can be a helpful start for the 
adaptation of the mandate to the needs of the conditions on the ground and more effective 
peacekeeping. 
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Among the lessons we have learned over time — including from the Liberian 
situation in 1990, Haiti in 1994, and East Timor in 2006 — is that the world must not pull 
out from post conflict states too early.  Consolidating peace and putting a country on the 
path to development requires sustained multi-year support.  It requires promoting 
development agendas that seek to transform the society and conditions that played 
midwife to the conflict.  Development agendas should put education, employment, and 
participation in governance at the heart of conflict resolution and post-conflict 
reconstruction.  The temptation among donors to favor immediate results and short time 
planning horizons in dictating their commitments, do not lend themselves to the kind of 
slow and sustained support required for post-conflict peacebuilding.  The international 
community has to remain engaged long after the peace process is solved — otherwise, 
history repeats itself.  Special attention must be paid to developing institutions of 
governance and public administration, a process which is, of course, complex.  First 
governance is a concept that is wider than, but includes, public administration.  Taking 
this into account, there is a need to guard against considering only institutions of 
government; the discussion must include institutions that facilitate collaboration, 
involvement, consultation, and participation of all stakeholders in all sectors (public 
sector, private sector, and civil society) in the act of governance.  The United Nations has 
recognized this and important steps have been taken within the UN to establish structures 
to address some of these issues.  For example, this article mentioned the Peacebuilding 
Commission initiative, and there are others such as the establishment of a mediation 
support unit followed by a team of mediators to provide technical expertise and support 
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for high-level UN and regional mediators.  In addition, the UN has established regional 
offices in West Africa and Central Asia to support UN peace initiatives. 
 Peacekeeping initiatives offer unique and extraordinary promise in bringing about 
and consolidating peace in the most dire of circumstances.  Given the enormity of the 
stakes, it behooves the international community to assess past peacekeeping experiences 
and draw from lessons learned.  Only with serious investment, planning, inclusion, and 
leadership can the promise of peacekeeping be realized — and it is an objective well 
worth striving to reach. 
